Feeding the Hungry, P. C. Hiebert, 1929

ry definite developed in this interview except that Brown unfortu- nately objected to our bringing more than two American workers into Russia, though I had gained permission from the Soviet Government to bring twenty. He assumed that we would have only a very small fund to expend in relief, just as the Soviet officials were regularly underestimating the A.R.A. projects, and, accordingly, cramping them, thus vastly reducing their efficiency. The A.R.A. had also been limited to a certain number of American personnel by the Soviet Government, but our twenty had nothing to do with the number fixed by Brown and Litvinov. The fallacy of setting such numbers as the maximum was later amply proved—but at the cost of unnumbered human lives. The price of office theory. When the letter of instructions arrived at Berlin, it revealed how difficult it was for any one not intimated UNSEALING THE CLOSED DOOR 183 acquainted with conditions in Russia through personal con- tact to imagine the complexities of the problems facing the relief organizations. Every worker in a foreign field ap- preciates this difficulty. But in the Russian situation the rapidly changing complexities were multiplied many times over. That failure to grasp fully the abnormal conditions accounted for the theoretical quality of many details in the relief plans of the largest as well as the small organiza- tions. ‘The Mennonite Committee was supposed to have a representative in Russia attached to the A.R.A. He would visit the Russian Mennonite settlements, investigate conditions, gather the necessary data, and report the needs. ‘The A.R.A. would deliver the food in the form of food packages consigned to individuals or groups, and our representative would check the results. Twenty-five per cent of our funds would thus be given over to the ACR AS It appeared as if the months of hard work spent in making our contracts in Moscow and Kharkow were all wasted effort; as if we were about to lose all the points of advantage gained through our own agreements. Ap- parently circumstances unknown to me had forced our Committee into acceptance of these plans. My observations of the conditions then prevailing in Russia, as well as my earlier relief experiences in that country, gave me the firm conviction that we could not possibly work efficiently under those terms; that we could not do our duty towards those who generously supported our relief work, nor towards the starving who needed our help. In the first place, travel was difficult. In the winter it might easily require six to eight weeks for one visit to only one settlement and return—and there were many settlements to visit, lying several thousand miles apart. For example, in the following February the city of Oren- burg, on a main line railway, had no train entering or 184 FEEDING THE HUNGRY leaving it during a continuous period of eighteen days. Several times during that winter tra