Soviet Evangelicals Since World War II, Walter Sawatsky, 1981

ere to demonstrate that their church polity ele suited to the Soviet system, and it was above all the Baptists nate is second big assault on religion into an embarrassing failure for the state. Motivations ; Motivations are often more important than the observable policy, _ in the best of circumstances the identification of real motivations ae remain tentative. Russian and subsequently Soviet leaders a fea . : reputation for paranoia. One. seasoned observer noted rat er nea iat “The Soviet state is by nature irritable. Any foreign body sets up ini ae tolerable itch which sooner or later must be relieved by a ener fe ch. Were we to approach our subject simply from the perspective of t e en gelicals, then the major motivation might be to scratch out the Baptist i és : The Baptists, with their readily comprehensible uae Learcie : orientation, determinist strain, apocalyptic and messianic a ea = emphasis on a highly committed membership anda nee ine oe zation, as well as their historic social consciousness, were put ime very similar characteristics to those of the Communist Party ey ee s both appealed to a similar psychological type, the ain $ mek 2 considered serious competition to the party. With its rapi tid - membership of one-half million, it was not that much os i an the party, which claimed 3.6 percent of the population as members. — The campaign, however, was directed against religion ee - the evangelicals were not. given any special treatment ae y e srt policy was clearly related to the political power struggle that = a Stalin’s death. On July 7, 1954, came the first signal. The party = - Committee approved a decision to take measures to improve scientifi The Khrushchev Campaign Against Religion 133 atheist propaganda which had fallen into decay.® Although the decision remained secret till 1962, there was a sudden flourishing of atheist propa- ganda.” But in November 1954 a second Central Committee ‘decision signed by Nikita Khrushchev alone condemned all administrative in- terference in religious affairs and all propaganda offensive to the feelings of believers. Khrushchev apparently signed this decision personally to demonstrate that this compromise was not a political setback for him. But by 1959, when the real campaign began under the direction of Khrushchev and his protegé, L. F. Il'ichev, he no longer needed to compromise with Bulganin, Zhukov, and Malenkoy, the earlier proponents of moderation.$ Although Stalin’s seventieth birthday celebrations in 1949 had amounted to an unprecedented deification of the leadel/foseph Stalin died like other mortal men on March 5, 1952. Soviet citizens were deeply moved but many were unsure whether to celebrate or to mourn. The leaders in government were also unsure what should happen next. The next few years came to be known as “The Thaw” because in many areas, especially of thought and culture; it seemed as if the freeze was off. Finally at th