Soviet Evangelicals Since World War II, Walter Sawatsky, 1981

e Twentieth Party Congress in 1956 Nikita Khrushchev read a major speech lasting seven hours in which he catalogued many of Stalin’s sins and ‘soundly condemned the cult of personality. This secret speech was leaked to an American official soon after and it was published by the American State Department. The de-Stalinization reached ‘its peak at the Twenty-second Party Congress in October 1961 where the congress resolved to remove Stalin’s embalmed body from its place beside Lenin and bury it by the Kremlin wall. By then Khrushchev, the new leading ‘spokesman against Stalin’s personality cult; was threatening to begin his own personality cult. When Stalin died, a ‘collective leadership consisting of Voroshilov, Malenkov, Beria, Molotov, Bulganin, and Kaganovich was announced, Nikita Khrushchev only emerged two’ weeks later when he took over Malenkov’s post as first secretary of the party, Malenkov retaining his post as prime minister. In December 1953, Lavrenti Beria, who had seemed the most likely successor to Stalin, was executed, having been removed from high office in July. Another change followed in F ebruary 1955 when Nikolai A. Bulganin became prime minister, Malenkov being consigned to a lesser post. What had seemed to be a triumvirate of Malenkov, Beria, and Khrushchev now became a two-man team with Khrushchev holding more power as head of the party than Bulganin as head of the state administra- tion. Khrushchev finally took over Bulganin’s post as well in March 1958. Where Stalin‘had been taciturn, Khrushchev’s ebullient personality assured 134 -. Soviet Evangelicals Since World War Il six years of turbulence before he was put aside by his subordinates, Brezhnev and Kosygin. Probably even more significant than the power struggle was the a ideology played in providing the motivation. Khrushchev has been heavily criticized for fostering a personality cult and for acting arbitrarily due to personal whim or the dictates of pragmatism: But in the same way that Khrushchev’s heavily criticized educational reform and agricultural policy ‘were due to his attempt to put communist ideology into practice, so an . ideological commitment explains the politically unwise attack on religion. Beginning in 1958, when Khrushchev was fully in the saddle, there was much talk about the necessity to plan for the changeover from socialism to communism. Since in simplistic communist ideology religion is defined asa remnant of the capitalist past, any full changeover to communism requires a final eradication of past vestiges. There are also. striking parallels between this attempt to move from socialism.to communism and the attempt by Stalin after 1928 to enforce collectivization and. industrialization. In: both cases religion served as an unacceptable theological vestige and as a ie ‘oat, 10 : af : a oihee aes factors were probably of lesser importance. Seen in the longer history of moderniza